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ABSTRACT. In the market  of business  services the easier 
segment  of  large business  is  being  saturated.  Therefore, 
suppliers  of  business  services  must  seek  to  cater  to  the 
growing but more difficult segment of small business, if their 
growth  is  to  be  maintained.  With  appropriate  extensions, 
Transaction Cost Economics can facilitate understanding of 
the nature of the difficulty involved. Due to effects of scale in 
transaction  costs  it is  relatively more  expensive to provide 
services  tailored  to  the  individual  smaller  firm.  Standard- 
isation  of services may be  required  to make access to this 
market viable. The question arises whether such standardised 
methods should be stimulated by the government. To see how 
this  issue  is  perceived  by  suppliers  of  various  business 
services, a survey was conducted on a sample of 1,000 firms, 
with a response of 30%. The issue of economies of scale in 
transaction  costs  did  emerge,  but  was  not  universally per- 
ceived as a problem. Many respondents confirmed the need 
for standardised modules. Opinions were sharply divided on 
the issue whether the government should step in to promote 
standardisation across suppliers. 
Cluster analysis shows that respondents fall neatly into a 
number of classes that conceptually and statistically are highly 
distinct. Just over half of the respondents were clearly against 
government  intervention,  and  about  one  third  of  these 
("radical  market  proponents")  were  of  that  opinion  even 
though they granted that the scale issue constituted a problem 
of access to the small business market. Just under half of the 
respondents  clearly favoured government intervention, and 
about  haft of those  ("radical interventionists") were of that 
opinion even though they saw no great problem of access due 
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to problems of scale, or were hesitant  about that  problem. 
Accountancy firms tended to be in favour of intervention, and 
business  consultants  tended  to be against. The government 
might  explore  the  matter  further  with  accountants,  while 
leaving the business consultants alone. 
Introduction 
In the present paper we conduct a theoretical and 
an empirical analysis of transaction costs in the 
provision of business services to small firms, and 
the role that standardisation might play to reduce 
transaction costs. 
In the analysis of transaction costs we make use 
of  the  theory  of  Transaction  Cost  Economics 
(TCE)  as  developed  primarily  by  Williamson 
(1975,  1985), with modifications and extensions 
where  required.  A  transaction is  an  event in  a 
process  of  economic  exchange  which  involves 
costs  of  contact,  contract  and  control.  This  is 
somewhat  of  a  generalisation  of  Williamson's 
(1985, p. 1) definition of a transaction as a transfer 
"across  a  technologically  separable  interface". 
Costs  of contact include costs  of search and of 
marketing:  the  collection  and  the  provision  of 
information or experience on price and quality of 
the product, and on needs of the user. Costs of 
contract include costs of setting up a "governance 
scheme": assessment of risk due to opportunism or 
to exogenous causes, and the planning of measures 
to hedge against them in the terms of a contract or 
other forms of agreement. We distinguish between 
governance  "structures"  and  schemes".  A  gov- 
ernance structure, as treated in TCE, refers to the 
type of transaction and the parties involved: the 
market,  a  hierarchy,  a  bilateral  or  a  trilateral 
structure.  A  governance  scheme  refers  to  a 
specific construct, in the form of agreements on 
content, procedures and rules, designed to govern 
a  specific  transaction.  Costs  of  control  include 
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costs  of executing  a  governance  scheme:  moni- 
toting  performance,  solving problems  (including 
possible costs of haggling,  litigation or arbitration) 
and adjusting an agreement. 
Transaction  costs have special  features in the 
case  of  "credence  products":  products  whose 
quality it is difficult to assess even after consump- 
tion. As a result of this property, product accept- 
ance  often  reties  on  trust,  based  on  reputation, 
prestige  or  personal  relation.  It  is  difficult  to 
stipulate  conditions  of  quality  ex  ante  and  to 
monitor  performance  ex post.  Hence the user is 
highly vulnerable to opportunism  on  the part  of 
the  supplier,  and  it  is  difficult  to  reduce  this 
vulnerability  by explicit  conditions.  Examples  of 
credence products are pharmaceuticals and intan- 
gible  technical  or  professional  services:  repairs, 
maintenance, medical care, professional advice. 
Professional business services include  services 
such  as:  accounting,  legal  counselling,  business 
consulting,  engineering,  medical  counselling  and 
care,  market  research,  design,  communication, 
logistics,  software and  computing,  training)  Sev- 
eral of these services are in the nature of credence 
goods:  If one  could  assess  the  service properly, 
one would hardly need it (think, for example, of a 
doctor or a  tax consultant). This yields problems 
in all  stages of the exchange:  in search and mar- 
keting, assessment of risk, monitoring of perform- 
ance. Note that this is a problem not only for the 
user but also for the producer: if one offers a high 
quality  service, it  is  difficult to demonstrate  this 
objectively, and attempts to do so may meet only 
with  distrust.  The  magnitude  of  the  problem 
depends on the user's ability to judge the quality of 
the service, which depends on the level of educa- 
tion and degree of specialisation of himself or his 
staff. 
There  are effects of scale in transaction  costs, 
which  pose  particular  problems  in  transactions 
involving small firms. Although scale effects in the 
supply of professional services will also emerge in 
the present article, the focus is on small business 
as  a  user  of  professional  business  services.  In 
particular,  the  question  is  what  effects of scale 
arise in transactions with small firm clients. 
Small business theory 
An  analysis  of  effects  of  scale  in  transaction 
concerning  business  services  should  rest  on  a 
theory of small business more in general. There is 
a  burgeoning  literature  on  entrepreneurship  in 
small business: on management,  innovation,  pro- 
duction, marketing,  strategic planning  and so on. 
We  cannot  fully  set  out  such  a  theory  in  the 
present article, and just a few of the relevant main 
lines will have to do. Many of the varying charac- 
teristics  of  small  business  (a  large  measure  of 
variation  is  itself  an  important  characteristic  of 
small business), that explain both weak and strong 
points, can be traced to the central characteristics 
of: the small scale, personality and independence 
of the small firm.  2 
Personality and independence together explain 
the large measure of variation:  the personality of 
goals  and  styles  of entrepreneurship  provides  a 
source  of  variation,  and  independence,  in  the 
sense of less dependence on shareholders and the 
attendant discipline of the stock market, 3 provides 
the opportunity for variation.  One can choose to 
maintain a marginal, unprofitable business for the 
sake of goals that  are idiosyncratic and unortho- 
dox from  the  "normal"  point  of view of capital 
markets  or  economics  textbooks.  4 One  may,  for 
example, maintain an old technology to maintain a 
favoured way of fife,  even if this  yields a  lower 
profit  income  that  outside  owners  would  never 
accept. The relevance of variation in the present 
context  is  that  it  creates  a  demand  for  tailoring 
business services to the individual firm. However, 
as  we  shall  see,  due  to  effects  of  scale  in  the 
provision  of business  services,  such  tailoring  is 
most  expensive where  it  is  most needed:  in  the 
smaller firm. 
Small  scale  accounts  for  much  of the  lower 
efficiency of small  business  in production,  plan- 
ning and marketing.  One particular  aspect of this 
that is relevant in the present context is the lack of 
specialised staff, in legal matters, personnel, mar- 
keting,  financial  planning  and  control,  combined 
with  an  often low level of formal  education  and 
training  of the entrepreneur  and, in middle sized 
firms, of second echelon management. 5 
This  explains  to  a  large  extent  the  often 
observed lack of formal strategic and operational 
planning  in  small  firms.  This  creates  a  need  for 
services  in  this  area,  but  also  a  problem  in  the 
marketing of those services. 
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merits attention on a somewhat deeper level, even 
if that takes us to a rather high level of abstraction. 
Differences in knowledge between small and large 
firms  are  associated  with  the  degree  to  which 
knowledge  is  "tacit,  in  the  sense  discussed  by 
Polanyi (1964).  In general, much of knowledge, 
particularly practical knowledge involved in skill, 
in tacit: one is not or only partially aware of having 
it, while it does form action to a large extent. The 
importance of the concept of tacitness is  that it 
explains how people can do things right without 
being  able  to  explain  how.  In  small  business 
knowledge is tacit to a higher degree, because it is 
based  more on practical  experience rather than 
formal learning,  and is  less  embodied in formal 
procedures.  Tacitness  of knowledge has  advan- 
tages: it allows for (and partly results from) infor- 
mality of task  fulfillment, without  many written 
plans,  blueprints  and  procedures,  and  thereby 
allows for flexibihty; it allows for a large measure 
of  autonomy  in  work,  with  its  attendant  job 
satisfaction  and  high  level  of  motivation;  it  is 
difficult to transfer or imitate quickly, whereby it 
helps  to  appropriate  the rents  from innovation, 
when  that  is  in  the  form  of  tacit  knowledge.  6 
However,  it  also  presents  a  problem  for  the 
absorption  of  new  knowledge  and  technology, 
which contributes to the transaction costs in the 
provision of business services. 
Effects of scale in transaction costs 
Nooteboom (1990) gives a detailed discussion of 
effects of scale in transaction costs; in the transac- 
tion stages of contact, contract and control. Here 
we  select problems  relevant to  the provision  of 
business services, and in particular those that may 
be mitigated by standardisation of those services. 
Costs of contact 
We begin with the costs of contact, for which we 
refer to Nooteboom (1990, pp. 4--5): 
As explored in marketing, in particular by Rogers (1983), 
search costs include the process of becoming aware of a 
need and the possibility of its fulfillment; the searching for 
fitting  solutions  and  alternatives;  trial,  evaluation  and 
decision. Marketing costs form the obverse of this on the 
part  of  the  producer:  seeking  latent  needs,  exploring 
solutions,  generating  alternatives  and  support,  seeking 
access to potential users. This access requires awareness 
on the part of the user, who is not always susceptible to 
novelty.  This  is  partly  a  cognitive  problem:  existing 
practice is often based on tacit, implicit knowledge based 
on  experience.  Having  evolved  into  routines  or  even 
reflexes, such  knowledge  is  often largely or partly  sub- 
conscious,  and  thereby  is  not  directly  open  to  critical 
reflection,  let  alone  rapid  change  or  replacement.  The 
creation of awareness will often require a careful explicita- 
tion of current tacit knowledge. A problem in the transfer 
of new technology is next that after gaining awareness the 
potential user is often not capable of evaluating it for his 
purpose, due to lack of knowledge. If one is rational one 
will face this, with the conclusion that judgement has to be 
delegated to a greater or lesser extent. That requires trust 
in  a  dual sense:  the other party  (to whom judgement is 
delegated)  has  no  interest  in  giving wrong  advice  (dis- 
interestedness),  and  is  capable  of  giving  good  advice 
(competence). The-latter requires knowledge and experi- 
ence with the relevant technology and its possibilities and 
impossibilities, given the specific conditions and priorities 
of the user firm in question. 
In view of the lower level and greater degree of 
tacitness of knowledge m  small firms, this yields 
effects of scale in the stage of contact. To continue 
the quote from Nooteboom (1990) (with italics for 
those problems that might be mitigated by stand- 
ardisation): 
For a small firm as a buyer, awareness may therefore be 
difficult to achieve. For an outside marketer this is often 
aggravated  by  a  lack  of formal, written  documentation, 
whereby it is more time consuming to conduct an evalua- 
tion of  present problems to assess needs. In the subsequent 
stage of the evaluation of alternatives, smaller firms have 
more limited resources of knowledge, so that their need to 
delegate evaluation is higher. 
Furthermore: 
Costs  of contact  often  contain  a  so-called threshold:  in 
order to contact and assess a potential transaction partner 
one has  to incur certain minimal costs regardless of the 
size of that partner or the size of the transaction: the cost 
of making an appointment, travel, setting up a diagnosis or 
audit, writing a  report,  evaluating a proposal,  etc. Such 
threshold costs weigh more heavily for small than for large 
volumes  of transaction.  This  creates  a  problem for the 
small firm as a buyer: the supplier has to expend relatively 
high  marketing  costs  per  umt  of  sale,  wi"dch may  be 
prohibitive below a certain volume. As a result, suppliers 
often charge a price with a fixed component per transac- 
tion  plus  a  variable  component  in  proportion  to  the 
volume of the transaction. Thus insurance companies, for 
example, demand a minimum (threshold) premium. As a 
result, below a certain volume the product is simply too 
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Costs of contract 
To assess effects of scale in the contract stage of 
exchange, one should consider effects of scale in 
the determinants of transaction costs as set out in 
standard  transaction  cost  economics:  opportun- 
ism, bounded rationality,  asset specificity, uncer- 
tainty and frequency of transaction.  Among large 
firms  as  clients  there  may be less  inclination  to 
opportunism because they may have more to lose 
in the way of investments in reputation  and in a 
broader  range  of  activities,  and  may  be  more 
visible politically. In other words: in small business 
there  may be more "fly-by-night" operators.  On 
the other hand, small firms may have fewer means 
and conditions for opportunism, due to a restricted 
scope of activities,  knowledge and  contacts.  The 
net  outcome  is  uncertain.  The  boundedness  of 
rationality is no doubt greater in smaller firms, as 
discussed  before.  Exogenous  risk  of  failure  is 
greater for smaller firms, due to a more restricted 
range  of products and spatially more constricted 
markets.  This  makes  it  less  attractive  to  make 
investments that are specific to a single small client, 
since the threat  of discontinuity is greater.  If the 
transaction  requires  a  specific  investment  on  the 
part of the user,  the smaller user will require more 
safeguards due to greater boundedness of ration- 
ality and lesser capability to absorb any toss due to 
discontinuity of the transaction. 
Transaction  costs  tend  to  be  systematically  higher  for 
smaller  firms.  Costs  of  governance  schemes  to  reduce 
transaction costs also are often relatively higher for small 
firms:  transactions  may  be  too  small  to  be  worth  the 
bother  of  such  a  scheme  ....  Small  firms  can  try  to 
mitigate this problem in several ways.  Collectively, they 
can  try  to  reduce  transaction  costs  or  the  cost  of 
governance  schemes  by  furthering  norms  that  restrict 
opportunistic  business  conduct;  by  stabilizing  market 
conditions to reduce exogenous uncertainty; by furthering 
technical standards  or standardised  procedures that reduce 
costs  of search,  evaluation,  contracting,  monitoring  and 
arbitration ....  Individually,  they  can  try  to  conduct 
business on the basis of personal trust. 
The problems indicated here arise in general, but 
most  of  them  are  aggravated  in  the  case  of 
credence  "goods"  such  as  professional  business 
services.  If  the  quality  of  such  services  were 
equally hard  to judge by large as by small firms, 
the difference in transaction  costs between large 
and  small  firms  might  actually  become less  for 
credence goods, because if something cannot be 
judged by anyone, the problems of search, evalua- 
tion and monitoring are equally large for small and 
large firms. However, the quality of such services 
is generally more difficult to judge, both ex ante 
and ex post, for small than for large firms, due to 
differences in the availability of expert knowledge 
and experience required for such judgement. 
Merits of standardisation 
Costs of control 
In the control stage of exchange it is more difficult 
for small firms to monitor the suppliers' perform- 
ance, due to a greater boundedness of rationality. 
They are themselves more difficult to monitor due 
a lack of formal, consistent, reasonably complete 
and reliable data, due to the often more informal, 
implicit and often highly personal nature of knowl- 
edge, oral rather than written communication, and 
limited  presence  of administrative  systems. This 
yields problems  not  only in  the  setting  up  of a 
contract  or  governance  scheme,  but  also  in  the 
monitoring  of compliance  and  the  evaluation of 
claims. Lack of objective information yields more 
"haggling".  And  recourse  to  arbitrators  can  be 
relatively  expensive  due  to  the  threshold  costs 
involved. 
Summing up (Nooteboom, t990, pp. 8--9): 
Due to scale effects, particularly in the transaction 
costs of contact,  contract and control, it is more 
difficult to profitably supply professional business 
services to small firms than to large firms. 
These  problems  may  be  mitigated  by  stand- 
ardisation  of  methods  and  procedures.  Where 
required, the method will remain specific to types 
of trade or industry, but it will minimize the need 
to tailor advice or information to the idiosyncratic 
needs of individual firms. One can think of general 
audits  or  function  specific  audits  or  check  lists 
for choosing action (in marketing, administration, 
financial  structure,  exports,  pollution,  legal  ac- 
countability,  franchising,  insurance,  mergers  and 
acquisitions,  strategic  planning,  patenting  and 
licensing,  and  so on). This  may avoid or reduce 
costs of tailoring a service product to the specific 
needs  of an  individual  user,  thus  reducing  dis- 
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costs of contact. It may also serve to simplify the 
design, set-up and implementation of contracts or 
other governance schemes, thereby reducing scale 
effects in costs of contract and control. 
The  potential  merits  of standardisation  are as 
follows: 
For the supplier of the service: 
--  the investment in the product is less specific 
to the individual user, whereby the supplier 
is less susceptible to risks of opportunism or 
of discontinuity on the part of the user; 
--  the  set-up  or threshold  costs of providing 
the product is less: less effort in making  a 
diagnosis,  in  tailoring  the  product  to  the 
needs of the user. This includes both costs 
of production and costs of contact; 
--  the set-up or threshold costs of setting up a 
contract  or  other  governance  scheme  are 
less  because  the  product  is  standardised, 
and because a  standardised  product makes 
only standard demands on information and 
administrative  procedures in the user firm, 
which are more likely to be fulfilled; 
--  for similar reasons, the scale effect and level 
of costs of control are also reduced. 
For the user of the service, in case the product is 
also standardised across suppliers: 
--  the  investment  in  knowledge  about  the 
product  is  less  specific  to  the  supplier, 
whereby the user is less susceptible to risks 
of opportunism; 
--  the  contact costs of search and  evaluation 
prior  to purchase  are lower. This  reduces 
costs not  only for the  small  entrepreneur, 
but  also  for  semi-public  agencies  that  are 
subsidised to provide information, guidance 
and  counselling  to  small  firms,  and  hence 
should save government expenditure; 
--  costs  of  switching  from  one  supplier  to 
another are also less with respect to contract 
and control. 
There  are, however, also potential  disadvantages 
of standardisation: 
For the  supplier of the service, in case of cross- 
supplier standardisation: 
--  reduced  opportunity  to  differentiate  one's 
product  and  thereby  create  loyal  and 
dependent  customers,  at  a  higher  profit 
margin. 
For the user of the service: 
--  in case of standardisation across users: less 
tailoring  to  the  varied  needs  and  idiosyn- 
cracies  of small  business  users  (though  if 
one is prepared to pay for the higher costs, 
suppliers are likely to be willing to provide a 
more tailor-made service); 
--  in case of standardisation  also across sup- 
pliers: less competition among suppliers to 
satisfy the demands of users. 
The needs and opportunities for standardisation, 
and for the opposite policy of differentiation, will 
vary between different types of professional ser- 
vice and different market conditions and positions. 
Standardisation  is  easier  where  there  are  fairly 
fixed  rules,  codes  or  conventions  (as  in  legal 
matters, accounting, insurance) and more difficult 
where the service involves more fluid judgement, 
subjectivity,  or  personal  skill  (as  in  marketing, 
strategy, personnel, organisation, culture). 
Perceptions  and  opinions  of  suppliers 
To investigate the issue empirically, a survey was 
conducted  of  perceptions  and  opinions  on  the 
matter  among  suppliers  of professional business 
services in the Netherlands,  in a research project 
commissioned by the ministry of economic affairs. 
A  sample of 1,000  firms was drawn from the 
list of service firms registered for the Dutch SMO 
management  support  subsidy scheme ("subsidie- 
regeling management ondersteuning", which yields 
a  subsidy on the costs of consultancy support to 
small firms). Of the roughly 2,500 firms on this list 
a  random  selection  of 350  was  made  from  the 
1,800 firms with less than  6  employees, and the 
remaining 650 firms well all selected, for a postal 
enquiry conducted in 1989. The response rate was 
30  %  for both  segments,  and  the  response  was 
distributed over firm sizes in the same way as the 
sample.  The  questions  concerned  characteristics 
of the service firm, type of service supplied, and 
perceptions  and  opinions  on  several issues  con- 
ceming  the market  of small  business. The  com- 
position of responding firms was as follows: almost 
50% general consultancy firms, 20% accountancy 
firms: 10% marketing/advertising/marketresearch 146  Bart Nooteboom  et al. 
firms and  10% computer service and consultancy 
firms.  The  remaining  10%  consisted  mainly  of 
engineering firms.  80%  of the  firms  existed  less 
than 30 years, and 50% less than 10 years. About 
75% was engaged in advice to individual small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME, defined as firms 
with less than 100 persons engaged). Assessments 
were asked,  on  a  five point  scale  of agreement/ 
disagreement,  on  a  number of propositions  con- 
cerning the SME market. Scores can vary from 1 
(strong  disagreement)  to  5  (strong  agreement). 
The propositions are listed in Table I. 
TABLE I 
Propositions on the market of SME 







Advice tailored to individual firms is too expensive 
for SME. 
From the perspective of costs one can work for SME 
only with more  or less standardised modules for 
groups of  firms (e.g.,  by type of trade). 
Even the use of standardised modules in individual 
firms requires consultancy/guidance  which makes it 
too expensive  for SME. 
By subject (auditing, export, etc.), the proprietary 
consultancy modules developed by different com- 
mercial consultancy  firms hardly differ. 
It would be more efficient to develop standardised 
modules with government subsidies and make them 
publicly available. 
The  development  of  proprietary  modules yields 
commercial firms a possibility to differentiate pro- 
ducts  and  to  specialise, which favours the  com- 
petitiveness and the quality  of consultancy. 
Note the radicality of proposition 5. It does not 
propose  government  intervention  for  the  mere 
promotion of standardisation,  but  for the  actual 
development of publicly available standard mod- 
ules for advisory services. 
Of the totality of respondents only 20% agreed 
with the first proposition that individual consult- 
ancy is too expensive for SME, but 25% neither 
agreed nor disagreed. This outcome may at least 
partly be due to the existence of the SMO scheme, 
which was after all geared to making consultancy 
to small business less expensive. The response on 
the  second  proposition  on  the  desirability  of 
standardised  modules  was  in  line  with  this  out- 
come.  On  the  third  proposition  that  even  with 
standardised  modules consultancy to SME is too 
expensive there was massive disagreement. 
On the fourth proposition that modules for the 
same type of activity hardly differ between com- 
peting  suppliers,  most  respondents  had  no clear 
opinion either way.  Opinions  were divided  very 
sharply on the controversial fifth proposition that 
it  would  be  more  efficient  to  develop  publicly 
available modules with government subsidy.  18% 
had no clear opinion either way; 38% agreed (22% 
agreed totally) and  46% disagreed (31% totally). 
When the sample is split according to size of the 
service firm, the counterintuitive result is that the 
percentage of agreement is  higher for the larger 
firms. A  split according to type of service shows 
that  particularly  accountants  agree  (61%  agree, 
28% disagree), and particularly business consult- 
ants disagree (30% agree, 53% disagree), but even 
within  these  groups  there  still  is  considerable 
variation. The difference between accountants and 
business  consultants  can  easily  be  interpreted: 
accountancy  is  much  more  easy  to  standardise 
than business consultancy, and among accountants 
there probably already is a  proliferation of seem- 
ingly different but actually similar procedures. 
Cluster analysis 
The results suggested that it might be worth while 
to investigate, with the aid  of cluster analysis, to 
what extent respondents fell into distinct classes. 
The survey had also had the purpose to inves- 
tigate,  for  the  ministry  of  economic  affairs, 
perceptions  and  opinions  on  the  accessibility  of 
the market of policy research in the area of SME, 
commissioned  by  ministries  and  other  govern- 
mental  or  semi-governmental  agencies,  of  the 
results  of  such  research  and  of  the  basic  data 
required to conduct such research. In the cluster 
analysis  these  questions  also  were  taken  into 
account. 
The  corresponding  propositions  to  respond- 
ents,  again  with a  five point scale of agreement/ 
disagreement, are listed in Table II. 
Only those  respondents  were included  in  the 
cluster analysis who had answered at least 7 of the 
9 questions from Table I and 1I. This reduced the 
number of firms to 225. 
Applying Ward's  method to the scores on the 
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TABLE II 
Propositions on the market of governmental policy research 
Index  Proposition 
7.  Organisations that can conduct policy research in the 
area of SME have sufficient insight in the research 
questions  of  interest  to  sponsors  of  this  type  of 
research, and have sufficient access to this market. 
Organisations  that  conduct  policy  research  in  the 
area of SME have sufficient insight in and access to 
the available research results (in the form of publica- 
tions) in the area of SME. 
There are sufficient public basic data (national and 
international  statistics,  databases  of firms,  market 
data,  etc.).  Further  data  can  be  produced  by  the 
market. 
six  clusters,  which  were  subsequently  analysed 
according to the  response to the propositions  in 
combination with other characteristics that did not 
contribute  to  the  clustering,  such  as  type  of 
service, size of firm etc. 
For  each  of the  9  propositions  it  was  inves- 
tigated,  by means  of an  analysis  of variance,  to 
what  extent  the  between-cluster  variance  was 
significant (in view of the within-cluster variance). 
The  largest  difference  emerged  for  proposition 
5,  illustrating  again  how  sharply  opinions  were 
divided on the issue of government intervention. 
Differences  were  not  significant  (at  a  5%  con- 
fidence level) for proposition 4. Differences were 
significant  at  the  1% level for all  other proposi- 
tions. Details on F values are given in Appendix A. 
For pairs of clusters the significance of differences 
in scores was investigated by means of T-tests. 
The clusters were investigated in terms of B and 
H ratio's, which are defined as follows: 
o, 
2 
H~j =  rio 
2  ,  oj 
where:  i  indexes  the  cluster  and  ]  indexes  the 
variable  (the  propositions  from  Table  I  and  II), 
and g  and a 2 are the mean and the variance. 
The  B-ratio  indicates  the  importance  of the 
variable for the identification  of the cluster. The 
H-ratio is an index of homogeneity: the lower the 
ratio,  the  more  homogeneous  (unanimous)  the 
cluster is with respect to the variable (proposition). 
In Appendix A  the average scores and  corre- 
sponding variances  and  the  B- and  H-ratio's  are 
provided for the six clusters. 
The clusters can perhaps best be characterised 
graphically  as follows: In Figure  1 we locate the 
clusters  in  a  space  spanned  by  the  scores  on 
the  two  of the  most  crucial  issues:  proposition 
1:  perception  of  the  problem  that  tailor  made 
advice  is  too  expensive  for  small  firms  (due  to 
threshold  transaction  costs); proposition  5: opin- 
ion  on  the  desirability  of  the  development  of 
standardised,  publicly  available  modules  with 
government finance. In this  space each of the six 
clusters has  a  box with  sides determined  by the 
following forrimlae: 
vertical: relative scores on intervention 
B, 5 -/4. 5 to B,5 +/4"5, 
horizontal: relative scores on market access 
B. -/4i to B. +/4. 
Thus  the  boxes  indicate  both  how  the  clusters 
differ with respect to the two central  issues, and 
how unanimous they are on those issues. 
With reference to Figure  1 we now label and 
discuss the six clusters. 
Radical market proponents: cluster 4 (n = 39) 
These  39  firms  agree  more  than  the  overall 
average, though their opinions are not strong, that 
there is a problem of market access (tailor made 
services  too  expensive  for  small  firms;  average 
score on proposition  1 is  3.5  with variance  1.0). 
Nevertheless they strongly and fairly unanimously 
oppose the idea that the government should inter- 
vene with public  standardised  modules (average 
score on proposition 5 is 1.7 with variance 0.7). 
Concerning  the issues in Table II, the firms in 
this cluster tend to consider the market of public 
policy research, its output and the data required 
reasonably transparent and accessible. 
When we look at the background variables we 
find  that  compared  with  overall  averages  the 
cluster contains relatively more business consult- 
ants  (rather  than  accountants),  more small firms, 
fewer small  and  more  large  clients,  more public 
policy research. 148  Bart Nooteboom et al. 
Considered market proponents: clusters 1 (n = 42) 
and 5 (n = 41) 
These 83 firms clearly disagree with the thesis that 
there is a problem of market access due to effects 
of scale (average score on proposition I for cluster 
1 is  1.7  with variance  0.6, for cluster  5  1.6 with 
variance  0.5).  Presumably  because  they  see  no 
market problem, both oppose the idea of govern- 
ment intervention  for standardisation,  but cluster 
1  is  significantly  more  outspoken  about  this 
(average  1.3 on proposition 5, with variance 0.4) 
than cluster 5 (average 2.0 with variance 0.8). 
There  is  a  significant  difference  between the 
two  clusters  in  their  opinion  on  the  market  of 
public policy research: cluster 5 sees no problems, 
but cluster i  does (for details, see Appendix A). 
Both clusters contain relatively more business 
consultants and fewer accountants, and have more 
international  contacts.  Cluster  5  contains  rela- 
tively more small  firms.  Cluster  1  contains  rela- 
tively more  large  firms,  and  firms  that  are  sub- 
sidiaries of (sometimes foreign) large firms. 
Considered interventionists: cluster 3 (n ~  51) 
These 51 firms are clearly in favour of government 
intervention for standardisation (average score on 
proposition 5 is 4.2 with variance 1.1), presumably 
because more than the overall average they tend to 
see a  problem of access to the market  of SME, 
although their views are not very strong (average 
score on proposition 1 is 3.4 with variance 1.0). 
The  cluster  contains  relatively more  account- 
ants and less business consultants, and more older 
and larger firms. 
Radical interventionists: clusters 2 (n = 23) and 
6 (n =29) 
These 52 firms are clearly in favour of government 
intervention  for  standardisation,  but  cluster  2  is 
significantly more outspoken on this issue (aver- 
age  score on  proposition  5  is  4.5  with variance 
0.4) than cluster 6 (average 3.9 with variance 0.8). 
This interventionist position is taken in spite of the 
fact that in cluster 2 there is much doubt about any 
problem  of access  to  the  SME  market  (average 
score on proposition  1 is 2.5  with variance  1.3), 
and in cluster 6 there is a clear belief that there is 
no  problem of access (average score of 1.7 with 
variance 0.7). 
Cluster 2 further distinguishes itself from other 
clusters by being significantly more hesitant about 
the positive role of proprietary modules for pro- 
duct  differentiation  and  competition  in  product 
quality (proposition 6), and by being significantly 
less optimistic about the sufficiency of public data 
available for SME research (proposition 9). 
Cluster 2 contains relatively more accountants, 
more small firms, less research for central govern- 
ment agencies, and more research for local semi- 
public  agencies.  Cluster  6  also  contains  fewer 
larger firms and conducts less research for central 
government  agencies.  It  has  the  fewest interna- 
tional contacts, and conducts relatively less regular 
consulting for individual firms. 
As an extension of Figure 1 a full discriminant 
analysis was also conducted, but this did not add 
any  significant  and  relevant  new  insights.  With 
four discriminant  functions  83% of the respond- 
ents were located in the proper clusters. The first 
most powerful function consisted mainly of prop- 
osition  5  (intervention),  and the second function 
consisted  of  the  first  3  propositions  (market 
accessibility). Thus the  results  resemble those of 
Figure 1. 
Conclusions 
The  use  of  transaction  cost  economics,  with 
appropriate  extensions  into  small  business  eco- 
nomics, appears to yield promise for the analysis 
of small business markets; in particular the market 
for professional business services. Analysis of this 
market is relevant from the perspective of govern- 
ment policy: business services can be of consider- 
able importance in supporting entrepreneurship in 
small business. 
Theoretically, one would expect effects of scale, 
particularly  in transaction  costs, which make the 
supply of professional business services to small 
firms relatively expensive, and perhaps too expen- 
sive for the desired dynamics to develop. Stand- 
ardisation  of  advisory  services,  in  proprietary 
modules of competing suppliers, or modules that 
are  standardised  across  suppliers,  may  help  to 
solve the problem. 
An empirical survey was conducted of opinions 
on  the  matter  among  suppliers  of  professional 
business services. In the first analysis, the problem Transaction Costs and Services to Small Business 
intervention 
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Fig. 1.  Location of the clusters. 
of higher  costs  in  the  provision  of professional 
business services to smaller firms is recognised in 
the empirical study, but not in a very pronounced 
fashion.  In  the  second  analysis,  on  the  basis  of 
clustering, the issue emerges more clearly. 
Opinions are divided on the issue whether the 
government  should  promote  standardisation  of 
modules  across firms.  On the whole, both small 
and large accountancy firms are largely in favour 
of the  idea,  while  business  consultants  tend  to 
oppose it. This makes sense: accountancy is more 
susceptible to standardisation  than business con- 
sultancy.  In  accountancy  a  proliferation  of pro- 
prietary modules has already appeared, and their 
value  for  obtaining  competitive  advantage  may 
have  eroded.  Outside  accountancy,  many  see 
proprietary  modules  as  a  legitimate  competitive 
weapon. 
A cluster analysis reveals distinct groups: 
--"radical  market  proponents"  (17%  of 
respondents),  who are opposed to govern- 
ment  intervention  for  standardisation,  in 
spite of the fact that they tend to perceive a 
problem  of  access  to  the  market  due  to 
effects of scale; 
--"considered  market  proponents"  (36%), 
who do not see a problem of market access 
due  to  scale  problems  and,  presumably 
therefore, oppose government intervention; 
--  "considered  interventionists"  (23%),  who 
tend to see a problem of market access due 
to  scale  problems  and,  presumably  there- 
fore, are in favour of government action for 
standardisation; 
--  "radical interventionists" (23%), who are in 
favour  of  government  intervention  even 
though  they  are  hesitant  about  any prob- 
lems  of  access  due  to  scale  problems  or 
even  are  confident  that  there  is  no  such 
problem. 
The conclusions for policy appear to be as follows: 
Although  the  extent  of  the  problem  of 
access  due  to  effects of scale  in  costs  of 
transaction  and  production  appears  to  be 
less  than  expected,  the  problem  does 
emerge  significantly.  It  may  have  been 
softened by the subsidy scheme for manage- 
ment support for small firms (SMO). It does 150  Ban Nooteboom  et al. 
bring  firms to the development of proprie- 
tary standardised modules for SME. 
Opinions  are sharply  divided on the desir- 
ability  of  government  action  to  promote 
standardisation  of  modules  across  firms. 
More easily standardised activities (account- 
ing)  appear  to  be  more  eligible  than  less 
easily standardised activities (business con- 
sultancy).  The  government  might  explore 
the matter further with  accountancy  firms, 
who are more favorable, while leaving busi- 
ness consultants alone, at least for the time 
being. 
Appendix A: Numerical details of the cluster 
analysis 
Table  AI  gives  the  F-values  in  the  analysis  of 




Proposition  F-value 
1  39.6 a 
2  43.8" 
3  23.5" 
4  1.4 
5  98.9" 
6  10.3 a 
7  7.4 a 
8  7.7 a 
9  25.0  a 
a  ~  significant at 0.01 level. 
For  each  of  the  6  clusters  and  each  of  the  9 
propositions  Table  AII  provides  the  average 
scores  and  corresponding  variances,  and  Table 
AIII provides the B-ratio's and H-ratio's. 
TABLE AII 
Average scores and variances 
Proposition 
Cluster 1 
Av  Var 
Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6 





































3.4  1.0  3.5  1.0 
3.7  0.6  3.1  1.2 
2.8  1.2  2.4  1.3 
2.8  1.4  2.8  0.7 
4.2  1.1  1.7  0.7 
4.0  1.2  4.4  1.0 
2.8  1.0  3.4  1.0 
3.0  1.2  3.6  0.9 






































B-ratio's and H-ratio's 
Cluster I  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6 










0.38  0.01  0.82  0.63 
0.45  --0.35  0.69  0.83 
0.38  -0.07  0.94  0.79 
0.94  0.37  1.2  0.02 
0.18  0.73  0.19  0.59 
0.64  --0.97  1.3  --0.04 
0.56  -0.10  1.7  --0.26 
0.58  0.03  1.9  -0.12 
0.70  --1.0  0.66  -0.03 
0.66  0.68  0.65  --0.57  0.32  -0.53 
0.42  0.41  0.79  --0.76  0.19  --0.14 
1.0  0.42  1.2  --0.52  0.26  --0.63 
1.3  0.04  0.62  --0.27  1.1  0.08 
0.48  --0.49  0.28  -0.35  0.33  0.46 
0.88  0.23  0.78  --0.14  1.2  0.48 
0.96  0.35  0.98  0.56  0.83  -0.06 
1.1  0.42  0.79  0.45  0.62  --0.16 
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No~s 
t  They  are  meant  to  exclude  business  services  such  as 
cleaning  and catering. 
2  SeeNooteboom (1987). 
3  Of  course  the  entrepreneur is  never fully independent: 
there are always the constraints of the legal framework, of 
norms  and  standards,  of banks,  and  of family owners  or 
partners, but this allows for more idiosyncracy than the stock 
market.  The  disciplinary effect  on managers  on the  stock 
market and of the market for managers is well known from 
recent economic theories  of organization (principal-agency 
theory). 
4  Cf. Nooteboom (1988). 
5  In this respect there is much variation, however, in par- 
ticular between more traditional entrepreneurs and spin-offs 
of firms, often in areas of new technology, from universities 
and large corporations, where the entrepreneur often has a 
university  degree. 
6  Cf.Dosi (1988). 
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